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According to the harmonic sequence paradox (Blavatskyy 2006), an expected
utility decision maker￿ s willingness to pay for a gamble whose expected payo⁄s
evolve according to the harmonic series is ￿nite if and only if his marginal utility
of additional income becomes eventually zero. Since the assumption of zero mar-
ginal utility is implausible, expected utility theory (as well as cumulative prospect
theory) does apparently do a bad job in describing this decision behavior. The
present note demonstrates that the harmonic sequence paradox only applies to
time-patient but not to time-impatient (risk-neutral) expected utility decision
makers.
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11 The harmonic sequence paradox
The so-called harmonic sequence paradox, due to Blavatskyy (2006), is based on the
following hypothetical gamble G:
￿Consider an urn that initially contains one white and one black ball.
An individual draws one ball from this urn and receives one dollar (nothing)
should the ball be white (black). Whatever the drawn ball happens to be,
it is subsequently put back into the urn. Additionally, one more black ball
is added to the urn. The individual then draws one ball again and the cycle
continues ad in￿nitum. At each iteration, the drawn white ball pays o⁄ one
dollar and the number of black balls is increased by one.￿Blavatskyy (2006,
p. 28)




with generic element x = (x1;x2;:::) and de￿ne the coordinate (random) variable Yt,
t 2 N, such that
Yt (x1;x2;:::) = xt.
Observe that the gamble G is given as a sequence of independently distributed random
variables (Yt)t2N with distribution





Pt;:::;t+k = Pt ￿ ::: ￿ Pt+k for k ￿ 0 (3)
the so-called ￿nite-dimensional distributions of the stochastic process (Yt)t2N on (X;F)
whereby F denotes the ￿-algebra generated by the following partition of X
X = ffxg j x 2 Xg. (4)
By Kolmogorov￿ s existence theorem (cf. theorem 36.1 in Billingsley 1995 or chapter 15.6
in Aliprantis and Border 2006), there exists a unique additive probability measure P ￿
on (X;F) such that (Yt)t2N has (3) as ￿nite dimensional distributions.
Given the measure space (P ￿;X;F) the monetary outcomes that can be earned by
an individual who participates in G for T iterations are described by the F-measurable
2random variable ZT =
PT
t=1 Yt. De￿ne now the F-measurable (theorem 13.4 in Billings-
ley 1995) random variable Z1 =
P1
t=1 Yt with extended range space R+ [ f+1g and
recall that Blavatkyy (proposition 1, 2006) reports the interesting result that
P
￿ (Z1 = +1) = 1. (5)
That is, any individual participating forever in the gamble G will earn with certainty an
in￿nite amount of money.1
In spite of this extremly attractive feature of G real-life people are only willing to pay
up to some ￿nite amount of money, say M (Blavatskyy considers M = $10 as plausible),
for a participation in G. In order to describe such preferences by an expected utility







= U (+1) ￿ 1 (7)
= U (M) (8)
whereby (weak) monotonicity of the von Neumann Morgenstern (=vNM) utility U of
money would imply that the individual is indi⁄erent between all amounts of money
greater or equal than M. This indi⁄erence, however, is quite implausible and appar-
ently at odds with the fact that individuals are not willing to pay more than M for a
participation in the gamble G. In a nutshell, the harmonic sequence paradox therefore
states:
Suppose that an individual regards a participation in gamble G as equiv-
alent to the random variable Z1. If this individual is an expected utility
decision maker￿ or for that matter a cumulative prospect theory decision
maker (Tversky and Kahneman 1992)￿ her willingness to pay for G is ￿nite
if and only if her marginal utility of additional monetary income becomes
eventually zero.
While the famous St. Petersburg paradox (Bernoulli 1954), respectively the super
St. Petersburg paradox (Menger 1934), can be resolved within the expected utility
under risk framework by the assumption of a su¢ ciently concave vNM utility function,
respectively by the assumption of a bounded vNM utility function, the above argument
demonstrates that such a resolution is not at hand for the harmonic sequence paradox.
Two alternative explanations for the harmonic sequence paradox come instead to mind:
1Observe that this feature makes G much more attractive to risk-averse individuals than just an
in￿nite expected value of Z1.
3Either real-life people have a totally wrong (subjective) notion about the ￿objective￿
probability measure P ￿ generated by G or they do not regard the participation in G as
equivalent to the random variable Z1.
In the following section we o⁄er an explanation of the harmonic sequence paradox
based on the latter alternative whereby we consider subjective expected utility decision-
makers whose subjective probability measure coincides with P ￿ but who identify the
possible outcomes of the gamble G as in￿nite streams of monetary payo⁄s rather than
as payo⁄-points in the range of Z1. We further illustrate our argument in section 3
by a simple example involving expected utility decision makers with additivly separable
time-preferences. Whenever these decision-makers are su¢ ciently time-impatient, their
willigness to pay for a participation in G is rather moderate. Since time-impatience
appears as a rather natural assumption for an individual who is confronted with a gamble
that goes on forever, our approach might contribute towards an explanation of why real-
life people only o⁄er a ￿nite amount for participating in the gamble G. Moreover, the
fact that an individual￿ s willingness to pay for participating in G is rather low might
then result from her correct understanding that the expected monetary payo⁄ increases
very slowly over time.
2 The general argument
The original statement of the harmonic sequence paradox considers a situation of de-
cision making under risk where the individual has preferences over lotteries with given
objective probability distributions. For our purpose it is convenient to slightly change
the perspective and consider an individual who is a subjective expected utility decision
maker in the sense of Savage (1954). That is, we consider a probability space (P s;￿;￿)
where P s is a subjective probability measure derived from the individual￿ s preferences
over Savage-acts which are mappings from the state space ￿ into some set of conse-
quences C. Under Savage￿ s axioms such preferences are representable by an expected
utility functional, i.e., for any two Savage-acts f;g,
f ￿ g if and only if E [U (f);P
s] ￿ E [U (g);P
s]
for a unique P s and a unique (up to positive a¢ ne transformations) vNM utility function
U : C ! R.
In order to recast the harmonic sequence paradox within this Savage framework, we
assume that the set of consequences is given as the possible payo⁄-sequences of G, i.e.,
C ￿ X = ￿
1
t=1 f0;1g. (9)
4Furthermore, we suppose that the Savage state- and event space are su¢ ciently rich in
the sense that they can re￿ ect the previous section￿ s de￿nitions of X and F. To this
end we assume that
￿ = X ￿ U, (10)
with generic element ! = ((x1;x2;:::);u), for some space U whereby the event space
￿ = F ￿ U (11)
is given as the product ￿-algebra of F and some ￿-algebra U on U. Observe that within
this Savage framework a participation in the gamble G can be de￿ned as the Savage act
fG : ￿ ! C such that
f
G ((x1;x2;:::);u) = (x1;x2;:::) (12)
whereby the consequence (x1;x2;:::) is interpreted as one possible outcome of the sto-
chastic process (Yt)t2N as introduced in the previous section. The following assumption
￿nally connects our subjective model to the harmonic sequence paradox by stating that
the individual￿ s subjective probability measure P s coincides in an apropriate way with
the ￿objective￿probability measure P ￿.
Assumption 1. For all A 2 F,
P
s (A ￿ U) = P
￿ (A).
Given this re-interpretation of the harmonic sequence gamble within a Savage frame-
work, the next proposition follows easily.
Proposition 1.
Consider a (weakly) increasing vNM utility function, i.e., U (c) ￿ U (c0) whenever
c ￿ c0 in the standard vector order.
Then the individual￿ s subjective expected utility of participating in the gamble G
















































￿ (x1;x2;:::) by assumption 1
￿ U (1;1;::) ￿ 1 by (weak) monotonicity
< +1.
The ￿nal line thereby follows from
U (1;1;::) = sup
C
U (c),
which is ￿nite by assumption.￿
By the above proposition, the paradox is trivially avoided as long as an individual
evaluates an in￿nite stream of one dollar payo⁄s by some ￿nite vNM utility. It is obvious
from the formal proof that this result holds for any subjective probability measure and
therefore as well for the harmonic sequence probability distribution P ￿ according to
which some consequence c = (x1;x2;:::) such that
P1
t=1 xt = +1 occurs with probability
one.
3 An illustrative example
As an illustrative example we consider in this section the special case of a vNM utility
function that results from additively time-separable preferences whereby we are in line
with the standard assumption of a time-impatient individual.2
Assumption 2. The individual￿ s preferences3 over in￿nite payo⁄-sequences x 2 X







2The reader can easily verify that the assumption of time-patient individual, i.e., ￿ = 1, in our model
would bring us immediately back to the original formulation of the harmonic sequence paradox.
3Recall that in a Savage-framework preferences over consequences are interpreted as preferences over
constant Savage-acts, i.e., acts that give in every state of the world the same consequence.
6for some strictly increasing function u : f0;1g ! R.










so that proposition 1 immediatly implies the following result.
Corollary. If an individual is time-impatient with additively time-separable prefer-
ences, her willigness to pay for participating in the harmonic sequence gamble G




Recall that a risk-averse (risk-loving) expected utility decison-maker is modelled
through a concave (convex) vNM utility function U whereby concavity (convexity) of
U results for the additive separable case from concavity (convexity) of u. Whenever we
speak of a risk-neutral individual, i.e., linear U, we noramlize w.o.l.o.g. u(0) = 0 and
u(1) = 1. For example, in case of a risk-neutral individual the corollary determines 1
1￿￿
as an upper bound for the individual￿ s willigness to pay to participate in G. While the
corollary characterizes only an upper-bound for an individual￿ s evaluation of the gamble
G, the following proposition gives the exact expected utility.
Proposition 2.
If an individual is time-impatient with additively time-separable preferences, she

























If, in addition, the individual is risk-neutral, her expected utility coincides with





































































The ￿rst line follows from the proof of proposition 1, the third line results from the
linearity of the expectations operator, and the ￿nal line uses the probability distribution
of the harmonic sequence gamble.￿
Suppose that an individual￿ s willigness to pay for participating in the harmonic
sequence gamble G coincides with the rather fast converging series (+++). In that case
we can easily come up with good approximations for the amount a risk-neutral individual
of our model would be willing to pay in order to participate a reasonable number of
rounds, say 1000, in the harmonic sequence gamble. For example, for ￿ = 0:99 we














To sum: For already small degrees of time-impatience a risk-neutral individual of
our model is willing to pay only moderate amounts of dollars in order to participate in
the harmonic sequence gamble (even considerably less than the ten dollars mentioned
by Blavatskyy). Obviously, this e⁄ect would be even more pronounced for risk-averse
individuals.
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